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Abstract 
The consent of the warring parties has always been a prerequisite for starting a UN 
operation and a key principle of the UN doctrine. However, consent in peacekeeping is 
often uncertain and fragile as a number of UN operations that have experienced serious 
difficulties with African state authorities demonstrate. This paper discusses host state 
consent in contemporary peace operations, with a particular focus on Africa, through the 
experience of the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI), a mission that 
had to struggle for most of its existence (2004-2011) with limited or ambiguous consent 
from the Ivorian president Laurent Gbagbo. UNOCI tried several options to manage 
consent, but the tension with the Gbagbo regime developed into open conflict after the 
2010 presidential elections, when the imperative to safeguard the election results 
introduced by the certification mandate clashed with the principle of consent.  
 
Introduction 
The year 2010 was a difficult one for United Nations (UN) peacekeeping. On 31 
December, the UN Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT) 
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officially completed its withdrawal at the request of the Chadian government after less 
than three years on the ground. President of Chad Idriss Déby insisted that the mission 
was useless and unable to fulfil its civilian protection mandate. In the same period, 
President of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) Joseph Kabila asked for the 
progressive withdrawal of the UN Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of 
Congo (MONUC), one of the most important recent UN operations in term of duration, 
personnel and financial burden. Kabila’s request to complete the withdrawal after the 
2011 presidential elections was unrealistic, but the mission was downsized and renamed 
UN Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). In Côte d’Ivoire, 
after certifying the victory at the polls of opponent Alassane Dramane Ouattara in 
December, the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) was ordered to leave the 
country by incumbent president Laurent Gbagbo. The mission refused to comply, but 
Gbagbo’s hostility to its presence meant inability to fulfil its mandate, and the situation 
developed into open conflict between President Gbagbo and UNOCI in 2011.  
The difficulties that the UN experienced in Chad, the DRC and Côte d’Ivoire did 
not stem from organizational or technical shortcomings but from a more fundamental 
challenge: the deterioration of the peacekeepers’ relationship with the authorities of the 
African states where they were deployed, which culminated in the withdrawal of 
consent to UN operations.1  
                                                    
1 For a general discussion, see D. Tull, ‘When they overstay their welcome: UN Peacekeepers in Africa’, 
German Institute for International and Security Affairs, Comment Paper 15, 2011; G. Piccolino and J. 
Karlsrud, ‘Withering Consent but Mutual Dependency? UN Peace Operations and African Assertiveness’, 
Conflict, Security & Development 11, 2011, pp. 447-471. 
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UN difficulties with African host authorities raise a series of questions, both 
concerning the significance of the principle of consent for the UN and the ambiguities 
of the ostensibly consent-based relationships of the UN with its African counterparts. 
First, what is consent in UN peacekeeping? Is the principle of consent just ‘organized 
hypocrisy’ or does it still matter and, if yes, in which way for UN operations? Secondly, 
why is consent so fragile and uncertain? What does the volatility of consent reveal about 
the relationships of the UN with African authorities? Thirdly, which options are offered 
to the UN when consent is uncertain and ambiguous or appears to deteriorate? 
The first section of this chapter looks at the meaning and relevance of consent in 
today’s peace operations. The second section places consent within the context of 
Africa’s external relations and conceptualizes state consent as a bargaining relation 
between UN peacekeepers and African rulers. The rest of the chapter illustrates the 
debate on how the UN can respond to a situation of uncertain consent using UNOCI in 
Côte d’Ivoire as a case study. Since its deployment in 2004 until the fall of President 
Laurent Gbagbo in 2011, UNOCI had to struggle with the Ivorian authorities’ uncertain 
consent. In the end, after the 2010 presidential elections, the mission broke with the rule 
of consent, generating considerable controversy at the international level.  
This chapter argues that, although its meaning has been partially altered by 
recent normative development in UN peacekeeping, state consent still matters very 
much for UN peacekeepers, in both operational and normative terms. However, the 
particular nature of the UN’s relations with host African states renders consent 
particularly fragile and problematic, with major implications for the work of UN 
peacekeepers.  
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The Meaning of Consent in UN Peacekeeping Today 
Consent occupies a central place in the normative structure of UN peacekeeping, but at 
the same time remains “a contested and not very well specified concept”.2 UN post-
Cold War policy documents, including the Report of the Panel on UN Peace Operations 
(Brahimi Report)3 and the UN Principles and Guidelines on Peacekeeping (Capstone 
doctrine),4 have insisted that the principle of consent remains a bedrock of UN 
peacekeeping. Yet, defining consent in today’s multidimensional peacekeeping is 
substantially more difficult than in first generation operations.  
The official UN Secretariat position on consent is given by the 2008 Capstone 
doctrine. The latter sees consent as implying “a commitment by the parties to a political 
process and their acceptance of a peacekeeping operation mandated to support that 
process”.5 It also establishes a distinction between consent at the ‘strategic’ and 
‘tactical’ level. Consent from “the main parties to the conflict”6 is considered an 
indispensable pre-condition for UN peacekeeping. On the other hand, the Capstone 
doctrine assumes that UN missions can use force against local ‘spoilers’. Thus, 
                                                    
2 I. Johnstone, ‘Managing Consent in Contemporary Peacekeeping Operations’, International 
Peacekeeping 18, 2011, p. 178.  
3 United Nations (UN), Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations [Brahimi Report], 
Independent Panel, UN Doc. A/55/305 - S/2000/809, 21 August 2000. 
4 UN, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines [Capstone Doctrine]. New 
York: United Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations / Department of Field Support. Online. 
Available at http://pbpu.unlb.org/pbps/Library/Capstone_Doctrine_ENG.pdf (20 October 2012).  
5 UN, Capstone Doctrine, op. cit., p. 31.  
6 Ibid.  
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examples of ‘robust peacekeeping’, such as MONUC’s military operations in the Ituri 
region of the DRC in 2005, targeting locally-based militias that were not part of the 
national peace process, are not seen as violating the principle of consent. On the other 
hand, the line between peacekeeping and peace enforcement would be crossed in cases 
of UN peacekeepers confronting one of the main warring parties, including notably the 
host state authorities.  
Several authors have noticed that in contemporary peace operations the line 
between consent and ‘no consent’ is blurred in practice. Ian Johnstone observes that 
consent is often qualified in three ways: it is unreliable (when the main warring parties 
do not fully control their followers or proxies), under pressure (brought about by 
aggressive international diplomatic efforts or even economic and military sanctions) or 
open-ended (the political process supported by the UN is so broad and complex that 
unforeseen problems can emerge at a later stage). Going further, Michael Lipson has 
argued that consent in today’s peace operations would amount to “organized hypocrisy” 
– “inconsistent rhetoric and action resulting from conflicting material and normative 
pressures”.7 He argues that the principle of consent, while retaining normative force, is 
in contrast with the requirements for effectiveness in the complex environments where 
contemporary peace operations take place, and thus regularly violated on the ground.8  
However, although the hypocrisy argument is suggestive, some of the examples 
of ‘robust peacekeeping’ brought in support of the notion that consent would be 
obsolete, such as the DRC and Haiti, are cases of use of force at the ‘tactical level’ that 
                                                    
7 M. Lipson, ‘Peacekeeping: Organized Hypocrisy?’, European Journal of International Relations 13, 
2007, p. 6. 
8 Lipson, op. cit., pp. 20-21.  
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are consistent with the current UN doctrine. To understand inconsistencies in UN 
peacekeeping in terms of ‘hypocrisy’ means, moreover, to neglect the fact that 
peacekeeping is an evolving, rather than static, field and an essentially contested 
concept. The evolution of UN peacekeeping in recent years has had a particularly 
ambiguous impact on host states’ consent. While certain post-Cold War normative 
developments have weakened the rule of host state consent, others have strengthened 
the centrality of state actors and the importance of gaining and retaining their consent 
for UN peacekeepers.  
A case in point is the current paradigm of state weakness and state fragility. 
Many contemporary peacekeeping and peacebuilding operations are requested to 
support state institutions and/or contribute to the reestablishment of state authority 
across the national territory.9 In Africa, the weak capacities of most African states and 
their historical emergence from decolonization as juridical ‘quasi-states’10 have been 
invoked for interpreting many African current conflicts, such as in Somalia, the DRC, 
Liberia and Sierra Leone, as crisis of the state.11 Statebuilding tasks are notably 
                                                    
9 R. Gowan and I. Johnstone, ‘New Challenges for Peacekeeping: Protection, Peacebuilding and the “War 
on Terror”’, Coping with crisis working papers series, International Peace Academy, 2007, p. 7.  
10 R.H. Jackson, Quasi-states: Sovereignty, International Relations and the Third World, Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1990. 
11 African countries typically receive the worst scores compared to other regions of the world in the 
various indexes of ‘failure’ and ‘fragility’ that have mushroomed in recent years. Among the most well-
known ones, see the Failed States Index issued by the Fund for Peace (Available online: 
http://www.fundforpeace.org/global/?q=fsi (2 February 2013)) and the State Fragility Index and Matrix 
2008 (Center for the Systemic Peace and Center for Global Policy. Available online: 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/SFImatrix08c.pdf (2 February 2013)). 
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included in the mandates of MONUSCO, UNOCI, the UN Mission in the Republic of 
South Sudan (UNMISS), and of the UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL). The focus on the 
restoration of state authority reinforces the qualitative difference between state consent 
and consent from non-state armed actors and the importance, for UN officers, of 
maintaining and nurturing state consent. Expecting the UN to help them reasserting 
their control over the national territory, state authorities have an incentive to welcome 
UN missions and facilitate their work. However, as the post-conflict reconstruction 
process advances and the state becomes stronger, national authorities’ dependency on 
the UN gradually withers and state officials become more assertive vis-à-vis the UN.12 
Current peace operations are however also viewed as instruments for protecting 
the civilian population. Notably, all peace operations currently deployed in Africa – 
with the exception of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara 
(MINURSO) – include the Protection of Civilians (PoC) in their mandate.13 Protection 
mandates place the missions in a difficult and potentially antagonistic position with the 
host state. In Africa, there are many examples of conflicts where state authorities have 
been accused of being responsible for egregious human rights violations or of having 
done nothing to stop them. The cases of Darfur (Sudan) and Côte d’Ivoire, where 
                                                    
12 Piccolino and Karlsrud, op. cit.; D. Edelstein, ‘Foreign Militaries, Sustainable Institutions, and Postwar 
Statebuilding’, in R. Paris and T.D. Sisk (eds), The Dilemmas of Statebuilding: Confronting the 
contradictions of postwar peace operations’, London: Routledge, 2009, pp. 81-103.  
13 See DPKO official website: Available online. 
http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/operations/current.shtml (2 February 2013). See also P.D. Williams, 
‘Enhancing Civilian Protection in Peace Operations: Insights from Africa’, Research Paper, Africa 
Center for Strategic Studies, September 2010. 
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current or former state rulers are under indictment by the International Criminal Court 
(ICC), are the most visible examples.14  
Furthermore, peacebuilding mandates focusing on the promotion of democracy 
and the rule of law, which are also part of most current UN operations, have an 
ambiguous effect on state consent: on the one hand they may put peacebuilders in 
conflict with state rulers preoccupied with their political survival above all, and having 
little interest in democratization and human rights. On the other hand, however, liberal 
peacebuilding is predicated on the developmental principle of ‘ownership’. Although 
the effective scope and content of ownership is debated,15 the notion surely 
encompasses the need of negotiating and obtaining the adhesion of national actors – 
both state and non-state – to the liberal peace agenda.  
To sum up, while the significance of consent may have evolved, consent from 
host state authorities still matters, not only in a rhetorical sense, for UN peacekeepers. 
Without state consent, most of the tasks currently ascribed to UN peacekeepers are 
impossible to execute. The problem is, however, that consent from host state authorities 
is inherently fragile and volatile. While host states may not raise official objections to 
                                                    
14 Information about the charges raised against Bashir and Gbagbo is available on the website of the ICC: 
http://www.icc-
cpi.int/EN_Menus/ICC/Situations%20and%20Cases/Situations/Situation%20ICC%200205/Pages/situatio
n%20icc-0205.aspx (23 March 2013) and http://www.icc-
cpi.int/EN_Menus/ICC/Situations%20and%20Cases/Situations/ICC0211/Pages/situation%20index.aspx 
(23 March 2013).  
15 For discussions of ownership, see T. Donais, ‘Empowerment or Imposition? Dilemmas of Local 
Ownership in Post-Conflict Peacebuilding Processes’, Peace & Change 34, 2009, pp. 3-26.  
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the deployment of peacekeepers, they may have very different priorities from those of 
UN operations.  
 
Peace Operations in the African Arena 
The relationships between peacekeepers and African ‘peacekept’ – the term employed 
by Christopher Clapham16 for the local warring parties of peace operations’ recipient 
countries – are inherently complex and tense. Looking at peacekeeping in the African 
landscape, it is important to stress that peace operations do not fall into a historical and 
political void.17 The view of African elites on UN peacekeeping and peacebuilding is 
shaped by their previous experience of a long series of intrusive external interventions 
of different kinds, from colonialism to Cold War sponsorship, development aid and 
structural adjustment programmes. Peacekeeping shall be seen in a context 
characterized by long-term dynamics of neo-patrimonial politics18 and political and 
                                                    
16 C. Clapham, ‘Being Peacekept’, in O. Furley and R. May (eds.), Peacekeeping in Africa, Surrey: 
Ashgate, 1998, pp. 303–319. 
17 For a discussion of the impact of historical legacies – in particular post-colonial legacies – on peace 
operations see M. Berdal, Building Peace after War, Adelphi Paper 49, Abingdon: Routledge, 2009, and 
B. Pouligny, Peace Operations Seen from Below: UN Missions and Local People, London: Hurst & Co., 
2006. 
18 For discussions of African neo-patrimonial politics and its relation to civil wars, see P.D. Williams, 
War and Conflict in Africa, New York: Wiley, 2011; and A. De Waal, ‘Mission without end? 
Peacekeeping in the African political marketplace’, International Affairs 85, 2009, pp. 99-113. 
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economic extraversion.19 Conflict-affected African countries have been compared to a 
“political marketplace”, which functions according to a neo-patrimonial logic.20 
Moreover, because of their weakness and their dependent position within the 
international system, African states have developed since their independence a whole 
battery of strategies for capturing external resources for the internal aims of ‘state 
survival’, while avoiding the strings of conditionality that often come attached with 
them.21 Hence, paradoxically, although African states are considered weak, their leaders 
may be quite successful at resisting external imperatives.22 
As Johnston suggests,23 consent is often granted by ‘peacekept’ under 
international pressures to stop military action, engage in negotiations and accept 
peacekeepers’ deployment. Yet, state authorities may have little commitment to engage 
in the negotiation process and continue to nurture the hope that a military solution is at 
hand. Liberal reforms promoted by peacekeepers constitute another possible source of 
tension. In Africa, externally-sponsored post-conflict democratization has been most 
successful in cases – such as Namibia and Mozambique – where state elites issued from 
liberation movements could expect post-conflict elections to reinforce their position.24 
                                                    
19 J.-F. Bayart, ‘Africa in the world: A history of extraversion’, African Affairs 99, 2000, pp. 217–267; C. 
Clapham, Africa and the international system: the politics of state survival, Cambridge and New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 1996. 
20 De Waal, op. cit.  
21 Clapham, Africa and the International System, op. cit. 
22 D.M. Tull, ‘Weak States and Successful Elites. Extraversion Strategies in Africa’, German Institute of 
International Affairs, Research Paper 9, August 2011. 
23 Johnstone, op. cit. 
24 C. Zürcher, ‘Building Democracy While Building Peace’, Journal of Democracy 22, 2011, pp. 81-95. 
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In most cases, however, the democratic reforms peacekeepers are pushing for are at 
odds with the preferences of state elites. Nevertheless, international peacekeepers also 
bring opportunities, in the form of security from insurgents, international legitimacy and 
material resources, such as development aid and technical cooperation. These 
opportunities are particularly welcome when the threat posed by insurgents is important 
and access to alternative resources is limited.25 
Peacekeepers and state authorities are typically engaging in a bargaining 
process26 where consent to the deployment of UN peacekeepers is traded by state 
authorities in exchange for security and external aid. In some cases, however, 
acceptance of the deployment of peacekeepers may just be a tactical move that can be 
easily reverted when state authorities perceive the UN presence as no longer useful or 
even harmful to their interests. Internal rulers have often a strengthened hand on 
outsiders, because of their better grasp of their own societies and their option to threaten 
them with violence or non-cooperation, up to the explicit withdrawal of consent.27 
The ‘peacebuilder bargain’ creates a dilemma to international peacekeepers and 
peacebuilders, as they cannot implement their mandate, especially when it involves 
extension of state authority and the organization of elections, without national 
authorities’ cooperation. The options that they have when they perceive that national 
authorities are not genuinely cooperative are, however, limited. First, they may choose 
to confront state authorities, by denouncing non-compliance, exercising pressures and 
                                                    
25 Piccolino and Karlsrud, op. cit.  
26 I. Johnstone, ‘Managing consent’, op. cit.; M. Barnett and C. Zürcher, ‘The Peacebuilder’s Contract: 
How External Statebuilding Reinforces Weak Statehood’, in Paris and Sisk, op. cit., pp. 25-52.  
27 See Barnett and Zürcher’s typology of ‘confrontational peacebuilding’, op. cit., p. 33.  
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threatening sanctions. This avenue is risky: it can generate even more resistance and can 
result into an explicit withdrawal of consent, and confrontation may escalate to 
violence. Alternatively, peacekeepers can try to accommodate host authorities’ interests. 
One faces here a very tight line between managing consent – creating space for the UN 
to operate through instruments such as dialogue, negotiation and persuasion – and 
“abdicating responsibility”28 – bending to the will of national authorities at the cost of 
renouncing the other principles that are supposed to guide the work of a peace 
operation. The UN Security Council can also choose not to deploy an operation at all, or 
to withdraw, if it perceives that the environment is unfavourable and national authorities 
are trying to manipulate the UN. Although this option would be equivalent to an 
admission of defeat, it would have the merit to make the bad faith of state authorities 
apparent and to avoid a waste of material resources and political efforts. 
UNOCI provides an example of an operation that had to strive since its launch in 
2003 up to the fall of the incumbent Ivorian regime in 2011 with limited consent from 
host state authorities. UNOCI tried several options to ‘manage consent’, which were in 
the end unsuccessful, as the conflict with Ivorian president Laurent Gbagbo became 
open after the contested 2010 elections. The mandate of certification of the elections 
attributed to the head of the mission provided in the end an escape from the constraints 
of consent. In the next section, UNOCI’s experience with state consent will be 
discussed, as well as the different strategies through which UNOCI tried to respond to 
the challenges that it was experiencing. 
 
Managing Consent in Practice – The UNOCI Experience 
                                                    
28 Johnstone, op. cit., p. 180. 
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The launch of UNOCI and its initial mandate 
UNOCI was officially established on 27 February 2004 by UNSC Resolution 1528.29 
The operation’s mandate outlined two main tasks: to monitor the ceasefire, by 
deploying along the buffer zone – zone de confiance – established between the 
government-controlled south and the rebel-controlled north; and to assist the 
government of national reconciliation in the implementation of the January 2003 Linas-
Marcoussis peace agreement. 
Although the Ivorian authorities had ostensibly given their consent to the 
deployment of UNOCI, the operation’s relations with President Laurent Gbagbo and his 
Front Populaire Ivoirien (FPI) party were from the start characterized by tensions and 
mistrust. Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) Albert Tévoédjrè was 
depicted as an enemy of Côte d’Ivoire by the pro-Gbagbo press30 and UN officers 
remind that a general atmosphere of hostility surrounded the UN as soon as they started 
to deploy.31 
The events that had preceded the launch of UNOCI contribute to explain these 
difficulties. Before 2004, the Ivorian peace process had been dominated by two main 
features: the military and diplomatic involvement of France and the strong antagonism 
between French peacemakers and president Gbagbo.32 France was Côte d’Ivoire’s 
                                                    
29 UN Security Council Resolution 1528, 27 February 2004. 
30 See for instance the commentaries of the FPI newspaper Notre Voie at the departure Tévoédjré from 
Côte d’Ivoire: A.V. Sanogo, ‘Pourquoi Tévoédjré a été limogé’, Notre Voie, 7 December 2004. 
31 Interview with senior UN officer, Abidjan, 24 August 2011. 
32 For a general discussion of the role of France, see Marco Wyss’ contribution in this volume. About the 
first phase of the Ivorian crisis, see also S.W. Smith, ‘La Politique d’Engagement de la France à 
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former colonial master and had historically maintained very strong ties with the country, 
including a permanent military base in the de facto capital Abidjan.33 Just following the 
beginning of the civil war in September 2002, the French mission Licorne had stopped 
the fighting and interposed between the Ivorian loyalist forces and the rebels of the 
Forces Nouvelles (FN).34 Operation Licorne was at the centre of a huge debate, as 
Gbagbo contended that, under the 1961 defence accords between France and Côte 
d’Ivoire,35 France should help the Forces armées nationales de Côte d’Ivoire (FANCI), 
the loyalist army, in crushing the rebellion. Gbagbo and his supporters argued that 
France refused to honour its commitments out of mistrust for a president who had 
criticized France’s neo-colonial role in Côte d’Ivoire. Gbagbo was playing over the 
ambivalent feelings that France’s post-colonial presence in Côte d’Ivoire generated 
among the Ivorian public.36 The situation got worse with the French-sponsored Linas-
                                                                                                                                                         
l’Epreuve de la Cote d’Ivoire’, Politique Africaine 89, 2003, pp.112-126; R. Marshall, ‘La France en Côte 
d’Ivoire: l’interventionnisme à l’épreuve des faits’, Politique Africaine 98, 2005 , pp. 21-41. 
33 On post-colonial relations between France and Côte d’Ivoire see for instance J.-P. Dozon, Frères et 
sujets: la France et l'Afrique en perspective, Paris: Flammarion, 2003. 
34 I have chosen for the sake of simplicity to use this denomination for the insurgents, who took the name 
Forces Nouvelles (New Forces) only in January 2003. 
35 ‘Accord de défense entre les Gouvernements de la République de Côte d’Ivoire, de la République du 
Dahomey, de la République Française et de la République du Niger’, 24 April 1961, Presidency of Côte 
d’Ivoire. Available at: 
http://www.cotedivoirepr.ci/files/pdf/Accords_de_defense_entre_la_Cote_d_Ivoire_et_la_France.pdf (16 
December 2010). However, the additional protocols to the agreement remain confidential. 
36 About the political exploitation of the rhetoric of ‘second independence’, see G. Piccolino, ‘David 
against Goliath in Côte d’Ivoire? Laurent Gbagbo’s war against Global Governance’, African Affairs 111, 
2012, pp. 1-23. About Ivorian nationalism under Gbagbo and the movement of the jeunes patriotes, see 
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Marcoussis negotiations in January 2003,37 which were denounced – with some reason 
– as partial and “neo-colonialist” by Gbagbo’s supporters. Nationalist youth groups 
close to the presidency, the so-called jeunes patriotes (young patriots), sparked anti-
French riots and demonstrations and the agreement proved soon inapplicable in its 
integral form. 
Aware of its delicate position, the French government had hoped from the start 
that Operation Licorne could be replaced by an operation either managed by the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) or by the UN.38 However, 
this proved impossible for several reasons. ECOWAS set up its own military mission 
ECOMICI at the end of 2002, but technical and financial problems as well as political 
difficulties delayed the deployment. The insistence of France that the UN get involved 
in Côte d’Ivoire was frustrated by the attitude of the United States, which blocked any 
Security Council Resolution on Côte d’Ivoire in the first months of the crisis.39 
                                                                                                                                                         
also R. Banégas, ‘Côte d’Ivoire: Patriotism, Ethnonationalism and other African Modes of Self-writing’, 
African Affairs 105, 2006, pp. 535-552; R. Marshall, ‘The War of “Who Is Who”: Autochthony, 
Nationalism, and Citizenship in the Ivorian Crisis’, African Studies Review 49, 2006, pp. 9-43.  
37 For the official English version of the Linas-Marcoussis agreement see Republic of Côte d’Ivoire, 
Linas Marcoussis Agreement, Annex I to the letter dated 27 January 2003 from the Permanent 
Representative of France to the United Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council, New 
York: United Nations. 
38 Smith, op. cit., pp. 121-122.  
39 H. Serequeberhan, ‘Le réengagement français dans les conflits africains et le défi ivoirien’, Annuaire 
Français de Relations Internationales 2005 VI, pp. 323-339. 
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The involvement of the UN in Côte d’Ivoire was thus slow and gradual. In 
February 2003, UNSC Resolution 146440 eventually endorsed the Linas-Marcoussis 
agreement, gave to Operation Licorne and to ECOMICI a Security Council mandate and 
nominated a UN SRSG for Côte d’Ivoire. In May, the UN reinforced its political 
presence by establishing the UN Mission in Côte d'Ivoire (MINUCI). Almost one year 
passed before the UN turned MINUCI into UNOCI, a full-scale peace operation that 
also integrated the troops of ECOMICI. For financial and security reasons, however, the 
Security Council decided to maintain Operation Licorne, with its separate chain of 
command, as a rapid reaction force alongside UNOCI.41 
The fragility of the political process that UNOCI was in charge of supporting 
and the presence of Operation Licorne, had important implications for UNOCI and for 
host state consent. 
If consent, in line with the UN Capstone doctrine, depends on the commitment 
of the warring parties to a ‘political process’, Côte d’Ivoire was a case of ‘consent under 
pressure’.42 Gbagbo felt that he had been forced to engage in the peace process by the 
French, who had stopped the fighting and pressured him into going to the negotiation 
table. However, even at the eve of the Linas-Marcoussis talks, he remained openly 
critical of peace talks that would have put on the same level both belligerents.43 Yet, 
                                                    
40 UN Security Council Resolution 1464, New York, 4 February 2003. 
41 The UN Secretariat had notably proposed, as an alternative, the creation of a larger UN mission: see 
UN, ‘Report of the Secretary General on the UN mission in Côte d’Ivoire submitted pursuant to SC 
Resolution 1514 (2003) of 13 November 2003’, New York, 6 January 2004. 
42 Johnstone, op. cit., p. 170. 
43 S. Smith, ‘Laurent Gbagbo: “Il n'y a pas de transition à organiser, il y a un ordre légal à rétablir!”’, Le 
Monde, 16 January 2003. 
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while avoiding admitting it publicly, Gbagbo and his associates were conscious of the 
weakness of the national army and knew that without France’s intervention in 2002 the 
rebels would have advanced towards Abidjan. As long as an FN attack remained a 
possibility, they presumably saw UNOCI, and even more so Operation Licorne, as 
‘buffers’ that, at least, guaranteed the preservation of the military status quo. In fact, in 
spite of the frequently expressed criticism of France’s policy, during the first two years 
of the crisis the Ivorian regime never mentioned the possibility of a withdrawal of 
Licorne. Its relationship with France was very ambivalent, and phases of reconciliation 
regularly followed moments of tension.44  
The presence of Operation Licorne was a double-edged sword for UNOCI. From 
the military point of view, the operation was a great asset. However, looking at the 
principle of consent, the coexistence between UNOCI and Operation Licorne was 
problematic. It can be said that, at the time of its deployment, Operation Licorne had 
also received the ‘consent’ of the Ivorian government, but this consent stemmed from a 
different rationale. Operation Licorne had found its initial legal justification not in the 
UN doctrine but on different grounds, the protection of the French community in Côte 
d’Ivoire and the Franco-Ivorian defence agreements.45 Although the interpretation of the 
agreements was controversial, there is little doubt that they had been originally designed 
as a means to protect the incumbent government, rather than to foster a process of 
dialogue between conflicting parties. France’s subsequent effort to present Operation 
                                                    
44 Smith, op. cit. L. D’Ersu, ʻLa crise ivoirienne, une intrigue franco-française’, Politique africaine 105, 
2007, pp. 85-104.. 
45 For a discussion of Licorne by the point of view of international law, see L. Balmond, ‘Sur quelques 
enseignements de l’“Opération Licorne”’, Arès XXI, 2004, pp. 83-96. 
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Licorne as a peace operation aiming at promoting a political solution, apparently 
placing it in line with the UN approach to peacekeeping, went against the preferences of 
Gbagbo, who had hoped that the French could support him against the insurgents.46 
Although the Linas-Marcoussis agreement required extensive international 
support for its implementation, the fact that Gbagbo and his supporters militated for 
reducing the political space of external actors meant that UNOCI was given a mandate 
that was “broad in terms of areas to be covered” but “limited in the sense that the 
mission was to ‘assist’ the Ivorian government in almost all areas”.47 Paradoxically, 
UNOCI’s position was complicated by the fact that Côte d’Ivoire was not a ‘failed 
state’ to the same degree as other post-conflict African countries where the UN had 
carried out peace operations, such as neighbouring Liberia and Sierra Leone.48 This 
implied that UNOCI had to work all the time alongside state institutions and its position 
in the ‘peacebuilder bargain’ was considerably weaker. 
UNOCI was facing a difficult dilemma. Consent was indispensable for carrying 
out a mandate that implied the cooperation of the Ivorian parties. However, if the 
mission interpreted too strictly its consent-based mandate, it risked to be reduced to 
insignificance and impotence. If, on the other hand, UNOCI chose to put pressure on the 
                                                    
46 D’Ersu op. cit.. 
47 G. Yabi, ‘Côte d’Ivoire’, in M. Edgren-Schori, D. García-Orrico et al., Security Council Resolutions 
Under Chapter VII, Madrid: Fundación par las Relaciones Internationales y el Diàlogo exterior (FRIDE), 
2009, p. 155. For a discussion of UNOCI’s mandate and its limitations, see also A.J. Bellamy and P.D. 
Williams, ’Local Politics and International Partnerships: The UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI)’, 
Journal of International Peacekeeping, 2012, 16(3-4), pp. 252-281.  
48 Interviews with UNOCI political officer, Abidjan, 16 July 2010, and with senior UNOCI officer, 
Abidjan, 28 July 2010. 
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Ivorian regime, it could compromise its relations with Gbagbo and host state consent in 
a definitive manner. 
 
2003-2007 Managing consent through dialogue or pressure 
Fostering consent in Côte d’Ivoire meant revitalizing the political process on which 
consent depended. Thus, the initial response to the hostility of the Ivorian president 
consisted in efforts to renegotiate some aspects of the Linas-Marcoussis agreement and 
make it more acceptable to the Ivorian participants, especially Gbagbo. UN Secretary-
General Kofi Annan was personally involved in one of the new rounds of peace talks, 
which was hold in Ghana at the end of July 2004. In November 2004, however, a 
violation of the ceasefire by the Ivorian loyalist forces gave a new blow to the peace 
process and marked the peak of the Franco-Ivorian antagonism. Airstrikes on the rebel-
controlled North, baptized by the Ivorian regime Opération Dignité (Operation dignity), 
degenerated into a quasi-war between Côte d’Ivoire and France after the still mysterious 
bombing of a French military camp by the loyalist troops.49 UNOCI was not directly 
involved in the clashes, which however highlighted the problems that the UN were 
facing in Côte d’Ivoire: the risk of an overall collapse of a peace process that posed on 
fragile grounds, the ambiguities of the consent-based mandate with respect to cease-fire 
violations, and the tendency of France to act independently from the UN, rather than as 
a support force. 
                                                    
49 About the November 2004 events, see Y. Konaté, ‘Côte d’Ivoire: le canari d’eau de Jacques Chirac’, 
Politique Africaine 97, 2005, pp. 117-132.  
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In the wake of these events, the Security Council adopted Resolution 1572,50 by 
which it established an arms embargo and nominated a Sanction Committee in charge of 
targeted sanctions against those responsible for egregious human rights violations and 
obstructions to the peace process. Resolution 1572 could have led UNOCI to go beyond 
its consent-based mandate. Its impact was however counterbalanced by the fact that 
South African president Thabo Mbeki, just appointed mediator by the African Union 
(AU), thought that more meaningful progresses could be made by restoring trust among 
the conflict parties. In the end, the adoption of targeted sanctions was postponed and 
UNOCI was given a limited mandate with respect to the arms embargo that only 
allowed the mission to monitor its respect.51 
A subtler source of tension with the principle of consent emerged by the 
outcome of the Pretoria talks sponsored by Mbeki, where the role that the UN was 
supposed to play in the post-conflict electoral process was discussed. Elections would 
have been organized by a revised Ivorian Independent Electoral Commission (IEC), but 
a “competent authority acting in the name of the international community” was to be 
mandated “to guarantee transparency and the strict respect of the rules governing the 
election”.52 The role of the ‘competent authority’ was not ‘consensual’ in the sense that 
its decisions were supposed to be independent from the will of the parties and motivated 
only by concern about the fairness of the electoral process. In fact, the unprecedented 
decision of the UN Secretary-General to nominate a High Representative for Elections 
                                                    
50 UN Security Council Resolution 1572, New York, 15 November 2004.  
51 UN Security Council Resolution 1584, New York, 1 February 2005. 
52 UN, ‘Letter dated 23 May 2005 from the Permanent Representative of South Africa to the United 
Nations addressed to the President of the Security Council’, New York, 24 May 2005.  
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(HRE) independent from UNOCI and from the UN SRSG suggested that the UN was 
aware of the difficulty to conciliate the consent-based mandate of UNOCI with the new 
task.53 
A new paralysis in the peace process was, however, leading to an indefinite 
postponement of the elections. In order to avoid an institutional deadlock, the Peace and 
Security Council of the AU met on 6 October 2005, taking a series of decisions that 
were subsequently endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 1633.54 Prime Minister 
of the national unity government Seydou Diarra was replaced by former governor of the 
Central Bank of West African States (Banque Centrale des États de l’Afrique de 
l’Ouest, BCEAO) Charles Konan Banny. At the same time, a ministerial-level 
International Working Group (IWG) was mandated “to evaluate, monitor and follow-up 
the peace process”,55 establishing what was seen at the time a sort of ‘international 
trusteeship’ on Côte d’Ivoire. Resolution 1633 also used for the first time the term 
‘certification’ for describing the mandate of the HRE.56 
UNOCI was actively involved in the IWG as Tévoédjrè’s successor Pierre 
Schori was given the co-presidency of the new organ. Such an involvement contributed 
to the deterioration of the relations with President Gbagbo and his supporters and to the 
                                                    
53 UN Security Council Resolution 1603, 3 June 2005. About the role of the UN in overseeing the Ivorian 
electoral process, see L.-A. Théroux-Bénoni, ‘Lessons for UN Electoral Certification from the 2010 
disputed presidential poll in Côte D’Ivoire’, Africa Initiative Policy Brief, Waterloo (Ontario): Centre for 
International Governance Innovation (CIGI), 2012, 
54 AU, ‘Communiqué of the 40th Meeting of the Peace and Security Council’, Addis Ababa, 6 October 
2005. UN Security Council Resolution 1633, New York, 21 October 2005. 
55 AU, op. cit., par. 10-V. 
56 L.-A. Théroux-Benoni, op. cit. 
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further fragilization of host state consent. In January 2006, the jeunes patriotes took the 
streets, claiming that a statement of the IWG, which acknowledged the expiration of the 
Ivorian National Assembly and pleaded for a non-extension, constituted an attack 
against the Ivorian institutions. They paralysed Abidjan for three days and encircled the 
headquarters of UNOCI. In the volatile town of Guiglo, the situation degenerated as UN 
peacekeepers opened fire on the demonstrators, killing five.57 It was the first time that 
UNOCI openly clashed with the followers of the Ivorian president. In the wake of these 
events, targeted sanctions were for the first time adopted against two pro-Gbagbo youth 
leaders and one FN commander. 
In the meantime, rumours circulated that Gbagbo was engaging in diplomatic 
steps for obtaining the replacement of Operation Licorne with a South African-led 
peacekeeping mission under the aegis of the AU. Although these rumours only 
concerned the possible expulsion of the Operation, the president apparently also insisted 
that the UN had to be excluded from the management of the Ivorian peace process.58 
Thus, consent from the Ivorian authorities looked at the mid-2006 more fragile than 
ever. 
Moreover, international pressure did not seem to produce the hoped outcome. 
UNSC Resolution 1721 of November 200659 responded to the lack of advances in the 
peace process by reaffirming and detailing the special powers of the prime minister and 
the international support for him. Given the lack of enforcement mechanisms, the 
                                                    
57 See International Crisis Group (ICG), Côte d’Ivoire: La Paix comme Option, Africa Report 109, 2006. 
58 ‘Nouveau processus de sortie de crise: Voici les propositions de Gbagbo à Mbeki et Compaoré’, Le 
Temps, 28 September 2006. 
59 UN Security Council Resolution 1721, New York, 1 November. 
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Resolution was judged by many UN officers unrealistic.60 Indeed, if the ‘trusteeship’ 
option was to be pushed to its ultimate consequences, it would have meant that the 
principle of consent had to be overcome. Yet, even if UNOCI were given a different 
mandate and different resources, leading the country to post-conflict elections without 
the cooperation of the Ivorian warring parties would have still been hardly possible. 
While the deadlock seemed unsolvable, this time the initiative came unexpectedly by 
the part of Gbagbo himself. 
 
The Ouagadougou Political Agreement: successful management of consent? 
In October 2006, after the vote of UNSC Resolution 1721, Gbagbo declared that he 
would seek a new roadmap for peace through ‘direct dialogue’ with the FN. On 4 March 
2007, the Ouagadougou Political Agreement (OPA) was signed and FN leader 
Guillaume Soro was designated as the new transitional prime minister. On substantial 
matters, the agreement differed little by the Linas-Marcoussis accord but the 
implementation formula changed. Responsibility for the conduct of the transition was 
transferred to Gbagbo and to Soro, thus eliminating the impartial prime minister 
equidistant from the parties to the conflict that was a cornerstone of the transitional 
arrangement set for by Linas-Marcoussis.61 
                                                    
60 Interview with UN officer from the Department of Political Affairs (DPA), Abidjan, 5 August 2010. 
61 République de Côte d’Ivoire, ‘Accord Politique de Ouagadougou (APO)’, edition including 
complementary agreements and implementing decisions, Abidjan: Centre d’Information et de la 
Communication Gouvernementale, 2010. For an analysis of the agreement see T. Charles and S.P.A. 
Handy, ‘L’Accord politique de Ouagadougou. Vers une sortie de crise pérenne en Côte d’Ivoire?’, 
Annuaire Français de Relations Internationales 2008 IX, 2008, pp. 653-667. 
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For the first time since 2002 the Ivorian parties had taken the initiative to go to 
the negotiation table. In this sense, the OPA seemed to lay down new grounds for 
consent-based peacekeeping in Côte d’Ivoire: differently from Linas-Marcoussis, which 
had been perceived as an agreement to some extent imposed, it represented a political 
process initiated and freely accepted by the conflict participants. 
For Gbagbo and his supporters, the OPA was also a way to curtail international 
influence over the peace process, while responding to international criticism by showing 
that the warring parties were committed to peace implementation. Ivorian actors insisted 
that the peace process was now “nationally owned”. Diplomats close to the Gbagbo 
regime were candid in admitting that one of the objectives of the direct dialogue was “to 
keep the UN out”62 and it seems that a total marginalisation of UNOCI was what the 
Ivorian authorities initially had in mind and the UN feared.63 UN officers were, 
however, able to persuade the Ivorian parties that excluding UNOCI was not realistic, as 
the support of an impartial actor was still needed in order to implement many practical 
aspects of the new agreement. Eventually, the Ivorian presidency seemed to be satisfied 
with a solution that implied curtailing UNOCI’s political influence. 
By UNSC Resolution 1765,64 which endorsed the OPA, the role of UNOCI was 
redefined as one of providing financial, and to some extent technical, support to an 
internally defined process. The ability of UNOCI to provide security was reduced, as 
the buffer zone was dismantled and a new internal body put in charge of election 
                                                    
62 Interview with senior Ivorian diplomat, Abidjan, 18 August 2010. 
63 Interview with officer of the UN Department of Political Affairs (DPA), Abidjan, 5 August 2010. 
Interview with senior UNOCI officer, Abidjan, 28 July 2010. 
64 UN Security Council Resolution 1765, New York, 16 July 2007. 
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security. The post of HRE was also eliminated, although, under demand of the FN and 
the Ivorian opposition, the ‘certification’ mandate was transferred to the UN SRSG and 
to a newly created ‘certification cell’ within UNOCI.65 
If one assumed that the OPA proved a viable framework and that the 
commitment of the warring parties to its implementation was genuine,66 the fact that 
UNOCI had less influence over the peace process was not a worrying development but 
rather represented a return of UNOCI to its original mandate. In this sense, Côte 
d’Ivoire could have looked at the mid 2007 as a successful case of consent management. 
In spite of the hostility manifested by the Ivorian regime UNOCI had been able to stay 
in Côte d’Ivoire and open clashes with the Ivorian authorities had been limited to the 
2006 episode. International pressures, although by themselves unable to re-launch the 
peace process, had eventually convinced the Ivorian parties that they had abandon their 
unconstructive attitude and find a viable agreement.  
An alternative interpretation was that the Ivorian parties had not abandoned their 
antagonism and their ‘winner take all’ approach to politics. They had realized that the 
situation of no war no peace was internally and internationally untenable. However, the 
OPA was a short term and opportunistic arrangement, rather than a fundamental step in 
the resolution of the crisis. The marginalization of the UN helped the Ivorian parties – 
which profited, in political and economic terms, from the division of the country – to 
pursue their game of postponement and mutual deception. In fact, presidential elections, 
scheduled for 2005 according to the electoral calendar, were postponed many times 
                                                    
65 Théroux-Bénoni, op. cit.  
66 This is notably the view hold by A.B. Bah, ‘Democracy and civil war: citizenship and peacemaking in 
Côte d’Ivoire’, African Affairs 109, 2010, pp. 597-615. 
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between 2007 and 2010. The Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) 
process, another centrepiece of the OPA, stalled in spite of the conclusion of a series of 
complementary agreements dealing with it.67 Thus, the mission of accompagnement of 
UNOCI proved more ambiguous than what the term suggested.  
As the time passed and the road map envisaged by the OPA was not met, 
disillusionment was the prevailing feeling at UNOCI’s headquarters. It seemed that, for 
avoiding endangering consent and falling back to the 2006 scenario, the UN had chosen 
a position of passivity and acquiescence. Attempts to block the peace process were 
rarely denounced in public by UN senior officers and the Sanction Committee avoided 
adopting any further targeted sanctions. Particularly significant was the UN SRSG’s 
acquiescence in February 2010, when the Gbagbo camp accused the chairman of the 
IEC of fraud, and the president dismissed both the IEC and the government.68 
In spite of the apparently passive aptitude of UNOCI towards the Ivorian parties, 
certain aspects of the UN mandate that went beyond the logic of accompagnement still 
bore the seeds of a potential conflict with the principle of consent, particularly the 
mandate of certification, now conferred to the UN SRSG. The problematic aspect of the 
certification mandate was all the more notable as South Korean Young Jin Choi, who 
had taken the lead of UNOCI after the conclusion of the OPA, interpreted it in a 
particularly strong manner – not just as assessing the fairness of elections, but also 
safeguarding the respect of the results, even by employing force if necessary.69 
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A second aspect of UNOCI’s mandate that could still clash with the principle of 
consent was the task of protecting civilians, although its scope was limited to the 
mission’s area of operations. Between 2007 and 2010, the human rights situation 
through the country had improved, but a rapid deterioration was always a possibility. Its 
protection mandate could lead UNOCI to clash with the Ivorian regime on the respect of 
human rights and humanitarian law. 
 
The 2010 elections and the collapse of consent  
As time passed by, the continuous postponement of the presidential election appeared 
unsustainable. In October 2010, time eventually appeared ripe. Pressure on Gbagbo was 
mounting and he had been convinced by opinion polls that he was now in a position to 
win. Those expectations turned out wrong: Gbagbo came ahead of the other candidates 
in the first round, but in the second round the alliance concluded between the main 
opposition parties proved to work and former Prime Minister Alassane Ouattara 
obtained most of the votes. The follow-up demonstrated that Gbagbo was not prepared 
to relinquish power even in such circumstances. The FPI-controlled Ivorian 
Constitutional Council tried to reverse the results by invalidating the vote in northern 
districts favourable to the rival and proclaimed the incumbent president the effective 
winner of the elections.70 
                                                                                                                                                         
stating that the UN SRSG would have safeguarded the results “by all means at his disposal” (UNOCI, 
‘Certification des Elections en Côte d’Ivoire/The Certification of Elections in Côte d’Ivoire’, para. 9, 
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In his certification of the elections, the UN SRSG argued that the alleged frauds 
were either minor or non-existent.71 While the certification mandate led to an 
irreparable break between UNOCI and Gbagbo, it provided a partial way out from the 
principle of state consent. By officially designating a winner of the elections, the 
certification changed Gbagbo’s status, from head of the Ivorian state to illegitimate 
authority. The international recognition of Ouattara as the elected president –  which 
deprived Gbagbo of the cover of sovereignty – was arguably the factor that allowed UN 
peacekeepers to ignore the order to leave the country given by the ‘illegal’ government 
nominated by Gbagbo. The latter, however, remained without any doubt one of the 
main warring parties to the conflict, and his withdrawal of consent had major 
consequences, both in normative and operational terms. UNOCI was prevented from 
operating normally and, in the months following the elections, harassment and even 
physical aggression against UN peacekeepers became a frequent occurrence. The 
mission concentrated on protecting the elected president and his government, trapped in 
their headquarters of the Hotel du Golf, but seemed unable to stop the wave of political 
repression unfolding in Abidjan. The situation escalated in February, when in an 
Abidjan neighbourhood reputedly favourable to Ouattara a guerrilla movement started 
to conduct attacks on the loyalist forces. In response the incumbent regime took a series 
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of indiscriminate actions, such as the shelling of a marketplace in the popular Abobo 
neighbourhood. 
In reaction, under France’s and Nigeria’s initiative, the Security Council met and 
adopted Resolution 1975. The Resolution, adopted on 30 March 2011, was framed as 
‘civilian protection’ and authorised UNOCI ‘to prevent the use of heavy weapons 
against the civilian population’72 by all necessary means. The implementation of 
Resolution 1975 was all the more delicate as, by the time of its adoption, the former FN, 
now re-baptised Forces Républicaines de Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI) and allied with 
Ouattara, were starting a major military offensive, encountering minimal resistance until 
their entry into Abidjan. Resolution 1975 could thus easily be read as a covert 
authorisation for UNOCI to support the FRCI against Gbagbo.73 
While the battle for Abidjan intensified, UN peacekeepers were attacked and the 
mission’s headquarters were repeatedly shelled by the pro-Gbagbo forces. Eventually, 
the exasperation and the prospect of a disastrous extension of the conflict persuaded 
UNOCI to intervene. On 4 April, UNOCI started a first helicopter attack over Gbagbo’s 
last strongholds, also targeting the presidential residence in further raids. Operation 
Licorne stepped in and its military strength played a determinant role in the eventual 
success of the raids. After a failed effort to obtain Gbagbo’s negotiated surrender, the 
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attacks resumed on 10 April. The day after, Gbagbo’s troops were finally conquered and 
the former president was taken into custody. 
UNOCI’s action notably raised criticism of two Security Council members, 
Russia and South Africa, which accused the mission of having gone beyond Resolution 
1975.74 UN SRSG Choi, however, strongly defended the actions undertaken by UNOCI, 
arguing that the UN had played a crucial role in both defending democracy and 
protecting the civilian population.75 Choi was supported by UN Secretary General Ban 
Ki Moon, who stated that UNOCI had acted in self-defence and to protect civilians in 
conformity with its mandate.76   
 
Conclusions 
The emergence of robust peacekeeping and of the responsibility to protect in the last 
decade have led some authors to proclaim prematurely the ‘death of consent’, which 
would have turned into ‘organized hypocrisy’. However, at a closer look, the norm of 
consent, particularly when it comes to consent from the host state authorities, has still a 
fundamental impact on the work of UN peacekeepers, although the necessity to 
maintain consent may clash with other norms and principles supported by the UN. This 
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is why, in contemporary multidimensional operations, managing consent requires a 
delicate balance between firmness and flexibility. 
 The case of UNOCI proves the continuous importance of consent in UN 
peacekeeping. Discussions about UNOCI have focused almost exclusively over the 
actions undertaken by the mission after 2010 and UNOCI has been labelled an example 
of ‘the new politics of protection’.77 However, a deeper analysis shows that, until the 
2010 elections, maintaining and nurturing consent constituted one of the major 
preoccupations of the mission. This preoccupation was partially in contrast with the 
other main imperative that drove the work of UNOCI, namely to ensure that the peace 
process progressed, in spite of the game of duplicity and manipulation played by the 
Ivorian parties. Born as a fully consent-based mission, UNOCI was gradually attributed 
a series of tasks that posed potential challenges to the principle of consent. After the 
parenthesis of 2005-2006, UNOCI’s senior officers became very cautious in avoiding 
any open clash with the Ivorian state authorities. However, the excessively complaisant 
attitude showed by UNOCI between 2007 and 2010 could have contributed to the 
outbreak of the post-election crisis, encouraging Gbagbo’s expectation that his electoral 
hold up was not going to meet significant resistance.  
With the events of 2010-2011, UNOCI had to radically reconsider its position. 
Clearly, UNOCI’s actions violated the principle of consent as delineated by the 
Capstone doctrine. Two main warring parties were engaged in violent conflict, and the 
use of force was pursued at the strategic level. Somewhat paradoxically, a UN mission 
that was at its beginning constrained by a narrow mandate of ‘assistance’ to national 
authorities ended up breaking with the principle of consent. An innovative mandate – 
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the certification – led to an irreducible conflict between the safeguard of election results, 
and thus democracy, and the principle of consent. 
It is difficult to tell if UNOCI will constitute a precedent. In particular, the 
impact of the certification mandate over the principle of consent may lead the Security 
Council to exercise more caution in the future in attributing again this task to a 
peacekeeping mission, and the warring parties to avoid asking the UN to play this role. 
Moreover, although much of the responsibility for the course of action taken by UNOCI 
goes to SRSG Choi, who was convinced that the UN had the right and duty to break 
with the principle of consent for defending the election results, UNOCI would have 
probably been unable to intervene militarily without Operation Licorne and without the 
diplomatic support of a large section of the so-called ‘international community’.78 
Given also the current difficulty for peacekeeping missions in securing well-trained 
troops, it is arguable that UNOCI’s break with the norm of consent will remain an 
exceptional case. 
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